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Breaks and Trends in OECD Countries’ Energy-GDP Ratios  
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper uses the econometrics of endogenous structural breaks to examine changes in 
energy intensity for OECD countries over 1960-2009. Nearly all OECD countries currently 
have significant negatively trending energy-GDP ratios; but for several countries those 
negative trends are recent, and two countries have recent significant positive trends. For 
several countries, energy intensity had a significant positive trend followed by a break and 
then a significant negative trend. Those break-dates, however, appear to have little to do with 
level of development (GDP per capita). Instead, among the likely causes of break timing are 
the volatile energy prices of the 1970s and early 1980s and the increased concern for the 
environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These findings have implications for future 
modeling of energy consumption as well as for the role of energy price policy in developed 
and developing countries.   
 
JEL codes: Q43, O13 
 
Key words: energy intensity; endogenous structural breaks; modeling environment and 
development   3
1. Introduction 
  The energy consumption to GDP (energy-GDP) ratio, or energy intensity, is an 
important topic of research in energy/environment; assumptions about that ratio and how it 
changes often form the backbone of projections of energy use and carbon dioxide emissions. 
A number of factors influence a country’s aggregate level of energy intensity: (1) economic 
structure (the share of energy-intensive industries in total economic output); (2) sectoral 
composition of energy use (i.e., the relative shares of different end-uses like industry, 
buildings, and transport); (3) fuel mix; and (4) efficiency in the conversion and end-use of 
energy. Because of the direction that many of those factors are trending, there is a strong 
belief that energy intensities of OECD countries are declining. Yet, very few studies have 
focused on determining explicitly what recent individual country energy-GDP trends are.  
A popular idea, which perhaps began with Goldenberg and Reddy (1990), is that the 
energy/GDP ratio follows an inverted U-path: energy intensity first increases as part of 
economic development/industrialization, but at higher levels of development energy 
intensity falls as economic structure typically shifts from industry to services and end-use 
efficiency improves. Galli (1998) and Medlock and Soligo (2001) confirmed the inverted-U 
hypothesis using panel econometric methods to explore the effect of income on total energy 
use. Galli (1998) used data from ten developing Asian countries spanning 1973-1990, 
whereas Medlock and Soligo (2001) used a 28 country sample that included many OECD 
countries and some developing countries (mostly Asian), covering 1979-1995. 
Grubler (2004), who studied the long-run historical path of energy intensity for 
several countries, agrees with the inverted-U hypothesis regarding commercial energy (i.e., 
fuels that are traded in a formal market, typically, fossil-derived fuels), arguing that the 
initial increase is caused by “… the substitution of commercial energy carriers for traditional 
energy forms and technologies.” However, he observed that total energy intensities (i.e.,   4
those that include traditional fuels such as fuelwood and dried cow dung) generally decline 
over time. Grubler (2004) showed a peak in commercial energy intensity in the early 1900s 
for the US and around 1950 for Japan.  
Gales et al. (2007) made a similar distinction as did Grubler, considering total energy 
(which includes traditional sources such as food for men and working animals, firewood, 
wind and water, and peat) as well as modern energy (same concept as commercial energy) in 
their examination of energy intensity trends for Sweden, Holland, Italy, and Spain over 200 
years. Their plots of modern energy intensity over 1865-1995 indicated clear peaks around 
1975 for Sweden, Netherlands, and Italy, but energy intensity appeared to be still increasing 
during their study period for Spain. Also, they argued that technological change accounted 
for much more of the decline in energy intensity than the rising importance of services did. 
Reduced form, income driven inverted-U models have been heavily criticized and at 
least partially discredited when applied to pollution—the so-called Environmental Kuznets 
Curve hypothesis—for several reasons (e.g., Stern 2004). One such reason is the objection to 
the “…assumption of a causal role of income growth and the inadequacy of reduced-form 
specifications that presume that a common income-related process … adequately describes 
the generation of the pollutant of interest,” (Carson 2010). In addition, the statistical 
grouping of countries at different stages of development does not necessarily approximate 
the actual development process that real countries go through. Indeed, Deacon and Norman 
(2006) used nonparametric methods to examine the income-pollution relationships of 
individual countries and observed that those within-country relationship patterns did not 
differ significantly from what would be expected to occur by chance.  
Moomaw and Unruh (1997) also took an individual country approach and tested the 
stability of a simple linear relationship between CO2 per capita emissions and GDP per 
capita for a number of developed countries using data spanning 1950-1992, choosing 1973   5
as the a priori break-date, and employing a standard Chow test for structural change. They 
rejected the null hypothesis of no structural change, typically finding that individual 
countries switched from a positive to a negative linear relationship between emissions and 
income at the time of the first oil crisis. 
This paper employs a now well-used method that determines the existence and timing 
of structural breaks endogenously to examine the energy-GDP paths for OECD countries 
over 1960-2009. All OECD countries experienced a break in their energy intensity trends, 
and most countries had two or more breaks. The current energy intensity trend for nearly all 
OECD countries is negative—however, for several of those countries their negative trend is 
recent, and two countries currently have positive trends. Considering endogenous breaks is 
important because energy intensity over this period has an inverted-V shape (a significant 
positive trend followed by a break and a significant negative trend) for 13 countries. 
Contrary to some earlier studies, however, that break-date appears to have little to do with 
level of development (either GDP per capita or energy consumption per capita). Instead, the 
timing of the energy-GDP ratio inverted-V breaks appears to be a reaction to the volatile 
energy prices of the 1970s and early 1980s or a result of increased environmental awareness 
and environmentally-focused institutions in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These findings 
have implications for future modeling of the energy-GDP ratio as well as for the role of 
energy price polices in developed and developing countries. 
To perform the classical econometric test for structural change, the Chow (1960) test, 
the break-date must be known a priori. Beginning in the early 1990s (and continuing today) 
a number of authors developed and subsequently improved tests to endogenously determine 
the timing of a structural break when the break-date is unknown. Glynn et al. (2007) 
provided a recent survey of the state of the art of these break tests. These econometric 
methods for endogenously determining an unknown break-date on time series have been   6
widely used in the economic growth literature (e.g., Ben-David and Papell 1998; and Ben-
David et al. 2003) as well as in the energy/environment literature.  
For example, Lanne and Liski (2004) examined the CO2 per capita emissions trends 
over the period 1870-1998 for 16 early industrialized countries using endogenous methods 
allowing for multiple structural breaks. In contrast to Mommaw and Unruh, Lanne and Liski 
rejected the oil price shocks as events causing permanent breaks in the structure and level of 
emissions; instead, Lanne and Liski found evidence of downturns in increasing per capita 
emissions trends occurring early in the 20th century, and evidence of stable declining per 
capita emissions for only two countries. Huntington (2005) used a single break procedure to 
endogenously determine a break in the carbon emissions-GDP relationship for the US over 
1870-1998, and similar to Lanne and Liski, found an early break in 1913. Liddle (2009) 
found a statistically significant break in the residential electricity consumption per capita 
trends for about half of OECD countries over 1960-2006.  
Two recent studies focused on energy intensity trends. Rao and Rao (2009) used a 
multiple endogenous break method (from Bai and Perron 2003) to examine the energy 
intensity trend of Fiji over 1970-2005, and determined a significant role for energy price 
shocks experienced there. Le Pen and Sevi (2010) analyzed the energy intensity trends of 25 
OECD countries over 1960-2004 using a test that allowed for a deterministic or stochastic 
trend and found that only 10 countries had a significant deterministic trend at the 0.05 level 
(eight trends were negative and two were positive). However, Le Pen and Sevi did not 
consider the possibility of breaks within the trends.  
2. Data and Methods 
I examine the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) data series: total primary energy 
supply (TPES) divided by GDP, which is in units of tons of oil equivalent (toe) per thousand 
year-2000 purchasing price parity (PPP) US dollars (USD), converted to natural logs for the   7
OECD countries from 1960 to 2009.
1  A visual inspection of energy/GDP paths suggests 
that many OECD countries’ experience can be described by linear trends around break-
points. (The paths of a few sample countries are shown in Figures 1a-d below.) 
To consider trends in energy-GDP ratios, I employ an approach similar to Rao and 
Rao (2009), and consider growth rates from a simple trend line regression: 
    yt = a + bt + et     ( 1 )  
Also like Rao and Rao (2009), I use the Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) method that allows for 
multiple endogenous structural breaks and trending regressors. Rao and Rao were cognizant 
of the complicated issue of uncertainty with respect to deterministic and stochastic trends, 
and argued that if a linear deterministic trend is wrongly assumed where a significant 
stochastic trend is actually present, then an endogenous breaks method would uncover a 
large number of structural breaks. Although, as Rao and Rao acknowledge, their approach 
does not resolve completely the deterministic versus stochastic trends issue, it seems a 
reasonable means to proceed and leverage the advantages of the multiple endogenous 
structural breaks method.  
The Bai and Perron method produces several test statistics; following their 
recommendations (Bai and Perron 2003), I focus on two: (i) the supFT(k) test for the null 
hypothesis of no structural break against the alternative of a fixed number of k breaks; and 
(ii) supF(l+1|l) test, which is a sequential test of the null hypothesis of l break(s) against the 
alternative of  l + 1 breaks. The supFT(k) test determines whether at least one break is 
present; if that test indicates the presence of at least one break, then the number of breaks, m, 
is revealed by the sequential examinations of the second set of tests such that supF(l+1|l) are 
insignificant for l >= m. 
                                                 
1 The energy data begins in 1971 for Czech Republic, Korea, Mexico, and Slovak Republic, in 1970 for the 
new federal states of Germany, and in 1965 for Hungary.    8
3. Breaks and trends in Energy/GDP 
  Table 1 displays the supF(l+1|l) statistics for l <= 3 and the break years for each 
country. In performing the tests, a maximum of six endogenous breaks were allowed. The 
supFT(k) tests were significant for k between 1 and 6 for all countries at the 5% level or 
higher. The supF(5|4) and supF(6|5) were not significant at even the 10% level for all 
countries (and thus are not shown). All countries’ energy-GDP ratios had at least one break; 
in fact, the majority of countries (19 of 29 countries) had two or more breaks (the US was 
the only country with four breaks). 
Table 1 
Table 2 shows the trends over each period (defined by the break dates in Table 1) for 
each country. Following the logic from Rao and Rao (2009), the number of breaks is not so 
great that the hypothesis of linear deterministic trends with breaks should be rejected in favor 
of stochastic trends. Indeed, the country with the most breaks in its energy-GDP ratio, the 
US, had a negative trend over the entire study period (and a statistically significant negative 
trend since 1969). Furthermore, the data shown in Grubler (2004), who displayed US energy 
intensity from 1850-2000, suggests a consistent negative trend for the US since early 1900s. 
Also, the US was one of the few countries that Le Pen and Sevi (2010), who did not test for 
breaks, uncovered a significant, deterministic negative trend. Lastly, of the 19 countries with 
multiple breaks, only five countries experience more than one statistically significant sign 
change in their trend over the study period. Interestingly, two of those five were determined 
to have significant deterministic trends by Le Pen and Sevi: Poland (negative) and Portugal 
(positive).   
Table 2 
All but three countries currently are experiencing significant negative trends in 
energy intensity—Luxembourg (since 2002) and Mexico (since 1999) have significant   9
positive trends, while Turkey has an insignificant trend (with a positive mean) since 2003. 
Six countries have had significant negative trends over the entire period (Australia, Austria, 
Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, and UK), and three more had such trends except for an 
early period with an insignificant trend (Belgium, France, and US). Yet, several countries are 
on recent negative trends, which were preceded by a period of significant positive trends: 
Greece (since 1996), Japan (since 1999), Korea (since 1998), Portugal (since 2001), and 
Spain (since 2004).  
3.1 Patterns of Energy/GDP 
Over nearly all of the 1960-2009 period, the Energy/GDP paths of all but one OECD 
country (Turkey) can be described by linear trends with breaks. Most of these countries’ 
Energy/GDP paths (22 of 28) either declined throughout or increased then decreased, i.e., an 
inverted-V path (13 countries,
2 typified by Netherlands).  
However, five countries combined inverted-V shaped paths with V-shaped paths, and 
one country (Luxembourg) had a V-shaped Energy/GPD path. Portugal and Spain had 
negative trends that were broken early and followed by fairly long positive trends (which 
only recently returned to negative trends). Mexico, arguably the least developed country in 
the sample, had an N-shaped path: Energy/GDP increased until 1987, when it began to 
decline, but resumed increasing in 1999 (although at a much lower rate than it did over 
1971-1987). More curious are Luxembourg, which had a significant negative trend until 
2002 when it became positive, and Poland, which switched from significant negative to 
significant positive during the first oil crises (counter-intuitively), but then back to negative 
during the second oil crises (as expected). Japan, different still, had a saw-tooth type path: 
after increasing until 1974, energy intensity had its substantial decline interrupted during 
1987-1999, where it increased slightly, before it resumed declining at a similar rate as it did 
                                                 
2 Korea’s Energy/GDP path was significant and positive for most of 1971-1998 (after which it was significant 
and negative). During 1980-1989, however, the path was essentially flat but had a statistically insignificant 
slight negative trend.    10
over 1974-1987. The Energy/GDP paths of Netherlands, Korea, Spain, and Japan are 
displayed in Figures 1 a-d. 
Figures 1 a-d 
4. Temporal causes of breaks in Energy/GDP 
Many of the breaks reported in Table 2 correspond to a change in slope of a still 
rising or declining trend; however, the most interesting types of breaks are the ones leading 
to an inverted-V pattern, i.e., a significant positive trend followed by a significant negative 
one. Inverted-V type breaks also are types of breaks that, when not considered, may have led 
Le Pen and Sevi (2010) to find so few OECD countries with deterministic energy intensity 
trends.  
4.1 Oil crises and increased environmental concern 
Figure 2 indicates the number of countries with and the timing of the 19 inverted-V 
type breaks (on the left y-axis) and shows the real international crude oil price from 1960-
2009 (on the right y-axis). Table 3, further below, names those countries and lists their 
corresponding GDP per capita in that break year. The two world oil crises of the 1970s and 
early 1980s and the period of relatively high oil prices in between appear to have influenced 
the timing of several countries’ break-dates (although not all). The first oil crisis
3 is dated 
1973-1974, whereas the second oil crisis of 1979-1981, which corresponded to the fall of the 
Shah in Iran and the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, led to considerably higher prices than 
the first oil crisis. Five of the inverted-V breaks occurred around the two oil crises or in the 
intermittent period of high prices (1975-1978)—and thus, responses to those high energy 
prices may have caused structural changes that lead to a lower energy intensity path. Yet, 
seven breaks occurred prior to 1973. 
                                                 
3 OAPEC announced on October 15, 1973, their embargo, which would precipitate the first oil crisis that led to 
a price spike later in 1974; but oil prices already had begun to increase earlier in that year.  
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Figure 2 
Policy driven by current moods or zeitgeist rather than level of development may 
have caused many of those earlier breaks. Indeed, the late 1960s and early 1970s (before the 
first oil crisis) was a period of heightened environmental awareness/concern in many OECD 
countries. For example, The Population Bomb by Paul Ehrlich was published in 1968; The 
Limits to Growth was published by the Club of Rome in 1972; the first Earth Day was held 
in 1970, and the first United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in 
Stockholm in 1972, which led directly to the creation of several government environmental 
agencies and the UN Environment Program. In the US, the first Clean Air Act was passed in 
1963 and updated in 1967 and 1970; in 1969 oil spilled from an offshore well in California’s 
Santa Barbara Channel, an event that was credited with expediting environmental 
legislation/institutions, such as National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the Clean Water 
Act in 1972, and the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970. Clean 
Air Acts were passed in Canada, New Zealand, and the UK in 1970, 1972, and 1968, 
respectively. 
Naturally, it is not surprising that oil price increases could have had the effect of 
altering energy intensity trajectories of developed (particularly developed, market-based) 
countries beyond what would have occurred merely because of 1960s/early 1970s 
environmental policy. At the time of the first oil crisis, nearly all OECD countries were 
heavily reliant on fossil fuels for their energy. And since 1978 (the first year in which IEA 
price data is available), the prices of various fossil fuels are correlated with each other, and 
the prices of petrol and electricity are highly correlated in all OECD countries—even ones 
like France and Norway that have substantial nuclear and hydro-electricity capacities.
4 
                                                 
4 For the 27 countries with sufficient data, the lowest correlation coefficient between petrol price and electricity 
price was 0.58 for Spain. For 17 countries, the correlation coefficient was greater than 0.86.   12
Furthermore, Liddle (2009) found that six OECD countries
5 had over 1970-1976 significant 
breaks in their residential electricity consumption per capita trends, and all six countries had 
substantially lower trends (all positive) post-break. Additionally, for five countries, 
residential electricity per capita flattened between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s (after 
increasing previously) (Liddle, 2009). 
Also, aggregate energy intensity can fall if countries shift from consuming fuels like 
coal to consuming electricity, or similarly, if they shift from using coal to create electricity to 
using non-fossil fuels in electricity generation. Indeed, such a shift seems to have happened 
in most OECD countries. Inspecting the series share of TPES from non-fossil fuel sources 
(i.e., nuclear, hydro, geothermal, solar, and wind) for OECD countries reveals the likely 
impact that policy changes (instituted in response to increased environmental concern and oil 
prices) had on the consumption of those non-fossil fuels: in 1971 only six OECD countries 
received more than 10% of TPES from non-fossil fuels, and only three countries received 
more than 20%; by 1981 those two counts had increased to nine and six countries, 
respectively, and by 1991 to 16 and nine countries, respectively (the latest IEA data indicates 
18 and 10 countries, respectively). 
4.2 Energy/GDP as a function of development (inverted-U) 
Table 3 displays the timing of the 19 inverted-V breaks along with the corresponding 
GDP per capita in the break year. The table provides little suggestion that similar levels of 
GDP per capita led to the change in sign of energy intensity trends (e.g., Galli, 1998 and 
Medlock and Soligo, 2001). Generally, the countries with the earlier break dates have the 
associated lower levels of GDP per capita, and the countries with later break dates have the 
associated higher levels of GDP per capita. The average GDP per capita at the break date is 
$15,000 with a standard deviation of over $5,100.  
                                                 
5 Those countries were: Belgium, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, and United States.   13
As further evidence that the break-dates had little to do with development level, of 
the seven late inverted-V breaks (and thus unlikely heavily influenced by the oil price spikes 
or increased environmental concern of the 1960s and 1970s), six occurred in countries that 
had among the lowest energy consumption and intensities in the 1960s and 1970s (Greece, 
Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal, and Spain); and thus, their relatively late breaks 
might be indicative of a convergence process. (Indeed, Liddle 2009 found evidence of 
energy intensity convergence among OECD countries.) Furthermore, for two of those 
countries, Korea and New Zealand, macro-economic events likely played a role, namely, the 
Asian financial crisis
6 and the 1990-1991 recession, respectively. The seventh late-breaking 
country, Japan, had already had a major inverted-V break in 1974, and its 1999 break 
appears merely to have reestablished the previous downward trend in Energy/GDP that 
(likely) was triggered by high oil prices (see Figure 1-d). 
Table 3 
By contrast, the panel-based studies of Galli (1998) and Medlock and Soligo (2001) 
found energy intensity peaks that arose at relatively low levels of GDP per capita
7 and, 
accordingly, occurred relatively early. Medlock and Soligo (2001) found that, for their 
sample, peak energy intensity was reached at around $2,600 GDP per capita (in 1985 USD 
PPP)—a level of development at which every developed country in their sample, except 
Greece and Portugal, had achieved by 1960. Galli (1998) calculated that at Korea’s energy 
intensity turning-point its GDP per capita was around $4,200 1985 USD PPP—a level Korea 
reached in 1985; however, Table 2 here shows that Korea’s turning-point (inverted-V break-
point) happened in 1998, and Korea was on a mostly strong increasing energy intensity trend 
prior to that date (see also Figure 1-b). The breaks associated with higher levels of GDP per 
                                                 
6 The Asian financial crisis began in July 1997, but its effects lingered through 1998. 
7 Both the Galli and Medlock and Soligo studies used a different source of GDP per capita (from the Penn 
World Tables), but the timing at which a given relative level of GDP per capita occurs should be roughly 
consistent with the IEA series used here.   14
capita found here probably stem from: the longer, updated data series used here; use of an 
individual country approach rather than the pooled panel approach of the other studies; and 
the other studies’ inclusion of developing countries in their cross-sections. 
Of course, it is possible that the countries that had significant negative trends 
throughout the study period and the countries that had mostly negative trends that were 
preceded by insignificant trends would have been shown to have energy intensity peaks at 
similar levels of early development had a much longer data set been available. However, the 
limited number of countries for which such long-run data is available suggests that would 
not be the case. Grubler’s (2004) data suggests a peak in the early 1900s for the US and a 
peak around 1950 for Japan (when Japan’s GDP per capita was less than half that of the 
US’s in the early 1900s). The case for development-based peaks is even less convincing for 
European countries. Data from Gales et al. (2007) shows an ultimate energy intensity peak in 
the mid-1970s for Italy, Netherlands, and Sweden after increasing energy intensity since the 
mid-1800s (most steeply prior to 1915 for Netherlands and Sweden); whereas, Spain’s 
energy intensity appears to be increasing still though 1995 (where the data used by Gales et 
al. ends).  
5. Conclusions 
  Nearly all OECD countries currently have significant negatively trending energy-
GDP ratios, but for several countries those negative trends are recent, and two countries 
(Luxembourg and Mexico) have recent significant positive trends. For six countries, energy-
GDP ratio was declining throughout the study period; but for 12 countries (and arguably 13, 
since Korea had a period of an insignificant trend sandwiched between two periods of 
increasing energy intensity) energy intensity had a significant positive trend followed by a 
break and a significant negative trend, and three more countries had early insignificant trends 
followed by significant negative trends. But the break-dates associated with those inverted-V   15
patterns had little to do with common levels of GDP per capita. Rather than economic 
development, the high energy prices of the 1970s and early 1980s and the increased concern 
for the environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s likely caused the energy intensity turn-
around in many countries.  
Thus, the timing of energy intensity declines (or inverted-V path slope changes) is 
related to significant events rather than being associated with a certain level of development 
(or per capita GDP) in an inverted-U fashion. That conclusion echoes Moomaw and Unruh 
(1997), who argued a similar experience was true for developed countries’ per capita carbon 
emissions paths. Yet, the idea that energy intensity is non-monotonic, i.e., increasing in the 
early stages of development and then falling in later stages, is theoretically appealing and 
generally characterizes a cross-section of the world’s countries at any one time. It is not 
surprising that Galli (1998) and Medlock and Soligo (2001) found statistical evidence of this 
type of relationship in their panel regressions that included both developed and developing 
countries.  
The fact that significant events—specifically events that involve (rather large) price 
increases (e.g., oil crises)—helped to spur lower energy intensity paths suggests that polices 
like “putting a price on carbon” could have a role in further lowering energy intensities. 
Furthermore, the results for OECD countries presented here suggest that lower energy 
intensity is not necessarily a natural part of the development process; thus, today’s less 
developed countries may not experience such a decline in energy intensity unless policies 
like energy price subsidies are ended. 
Allowing for breaks, a considerably larger number of OECD countries were found to 
have deterministic energy intensity trends than uncovered by Le Pen and Sevi (2010)—in no 
small part because at least 12 countries were found here to have significant positive trends 
followed by a break and significant negative trends. However, the deterministic trend with   16
breaks model may not be preferable to a stochastic trend model for all the countries 
displayed in Table 2. For example, Mexico and Turkey may not fit the deterministic trend 
model because they are still very much developing countries; also, data from 1960 may not 
be a long enough series to develop an accurate picture for Japan and Spain—again, longer 
time series data indicates a mostly declining energy intensity since 1950 for Japan (from 
Grubler 2004) and a mostly increasing energy intensity since 1865 for Spain (from Gales et 
al. 2007).  
Finally, analysts using energy-GDP ratios as a basis to produce medium-to-long-run 
energy consumption projections should consider whether energy/GDP should be a function 
of GDP per capita; such caution is advised because OECD countries vary considerably in 
both the timing of, and the level of GDP per capita corresponding to, their energy intensity 
downturns. Further caution is advised in selecting the historical data used to calculate the 
energy-GDP ratio since many countries appear to be on relatively recent trends.  
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Table 1. Bai and Perron endogenous structural break tests on OECD countries’ energy-GDP 
ratios 
 supF(l+1|l) statistics to determine the number of breaks  Timing of breaks 
  supF(1|0) supF(2|1) supF(3|2) supF(4|3)        
Australia  49.4***  8.3  9.7  4.6    1973     
Austria  14.3**  8.3  5.9  3.8    1980     
Belgium  20.6***  14.9**  18.6**  3.3   1967 1980 1995  
Canada  105.3*** 21.8***  9.2  8.2    1971  1991     
Czech Rep.  18.5***  8.0  12.7  3.8    1984     
Denmark  99.2***  5.7  7.6  4.6    1970     
Finland  28.4*** 23.2***  3.7  4.3    1967  1992     
France  29.9*** 14.6**  8.5  2.8   1969  1984     
Germany  53.4***  7.9  6.3  4.5    1989     
Greece  122.0*** 58.5***  13.2  9.2    1971  1996     
Hungary  157.8***  6.9  3.8  6.9    1997     
Ireland  102.6*** 38.2***  7.7  6.1    1974  1989     
Italy  73.1*** 86.7***  10.3  12.2   1969  1985     
Japan  41.6***  35.1***  23.2***  6.2   1974 1987 1999  
Korea  41.3***  16.2**  15.6**  7.2   1980 1989 1998  
Luxembourg  26.3*** 29.4***  7.4  11.4   1974  2002     
Mexico  120.9*** 23.0***  5.4  3.1    1987  1999     
Netherlands  326.7***  7.1  7.8  4.4    1971     
New Zealand  108.2***  7.6  8.6  7.0    1990     
Norway  165.1***  9.3  3.4  2.4    1970     
Poland  285.6***  13.7*  23.5***  7.1   1973 1981 1997  
Portugal  15.8** 24.8***  4.9  4.0   1968  2001     
Slovakia  139.5***  21.1***  13.9*  5.8   1977 1990 2000  
Spain  106.5***  15.7**  27.7***  5.1   1965 1976 2004  
Sweden  73.4*** 32.0***  4.0  5.7    1967  1996     
Switzerland  160.4***  9.4  4.1  3.9    1978     
Turkey  45.6*** 23.3***  4.1  5.9    1971  2003     
United Kingdom  40.0*** 65.3***  7.0  2.0    1969  1990     
United States  150.4***  22.8***  16.5**  17.1**   1969 1976 1986 1996 
Notes: The supFT(k) tests were significant for k between 1 and 6 for all countries at the 5% 
level or higher. The supF(5|4) and supF(6|5) were not significant at even the 10% level for 
all countries. Statistical significance indicated by: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, or * 0.1 level. 
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Table 2. OECD energy-GDP trends over 1960-2009 with endogenously determined 
structural breaks 



































































































































































  Trends for country with four breaks 










Note: Statistical significance indicated by: *** 0.001, **0.01, or * 0.05 level.   21
Table 3. Break year GDP per capita for OECD countries with inverted-V type energy-GDP 
paths 
  Break year  Break year GDP per capita (yr-2000 US$ PPP) 
Finland 1967  10,332 
Sweden 1967  14,467 
Italy 1969  12,149 
Denmark 1970  15,530 
Norway 1970  14,477 
Canada 1971  15,810 
Netherlands 1971  15,907 
Ireland 1974  9,346 
Japan 1974  13,804 
Slovakia 1977  9,105 
Switzerland 1978  23,362 
Poland 1981  7,130 
Mexico 1987  7,512 
New Zealand  1990  18,034 
Greece 1996  18,443 
Korea 1998  13,974 
Japan 1999  24,811 
Portugal 2001  18,627 
Spain 2004  22,522 
    
Average   15,018 
Standard deviation    5,145 
 































Figure 1-a. Natural log of energy intensity for Netherlands, 1960-2009, and two linear trend 






























Figure 1-b. Natural log of energy intensity for Korea, 1971-2009, and four linear trend lines 
with breaks in 1980, 1989, and 1998. 
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Figure 1-c. Natural log of energy intensity for Spain, 1960-2009, and four linear trend lines 
































Figure 1-d. Natural log of energy intensity for Japan, 1960-2009, and four linear trend lines 






















































































































































































































Figure 2. The timing of and the number of OECD countries with inverted-V type breaks in 
energy intensity trends (bars and left y-axis) and the real international crude oil price (trace 
and right y-axis), 1960-2009. Price data is from 2009 BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy, http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview. 
 